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On the Complexities of Race:
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
Dred Scott v. Sandford
GUADALUPE T. LUNA*

Failure to see the complexity of race leads to failure to understand
racism. LatCrit theory endeavors to transform our understanding of
race.I
Moving towards a more "sophisticated understanding of race," LatCrit theorists are exposing denied linkages between the marginalization
of communities of color and legal norms refuted by mainstream law.2
Mainstream theorists, in their demands for universality3 and sameness,4
* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University, B.A., University of Minnesota;
J.D., University of Minnesota. This essay derives from a larger work in progress and evolves
from my ongoing investigations on the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which are referenced
throughout this essay.
1. Leslie Espinoza and Angela Harris, Afterword: Embracing The Tar-Baby-LatCrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 10 LA RAZA L. J. 499, 507 (1998).
2. Environmental racism in our communities of color serves as an example of denied
linkages. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Race, Class, Environmental Regulation, Introduction:
Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839, 841 (1992); David L. Hanna,
Third World Texas: NAFTA, State Law, and Environmental Problems Facing Texas Colonias, 27
ST. MARY'S L. J. 871 (1996); Guadalupe T. Luna, Agricultural Underdogs and International
Agreements, 26 N.M. L. REV. 9 (1996); ROBERT BULLARD, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (1994); Sheila Foster, Justice From the Group Up: Distributive
Inequities, Grassroots,Resistance, And The Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice
Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775 (1998); Robert W. Collin, Review of the Legal Literature on
Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity and Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. &
LrrI. 121 (1994).
3. Immanuel Wallerstein, Culture As the Ideological Battleground of the Modern WorldSystem, in GLOBAL CULTURE, NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY, 31-55 (Mike
Featherstone ed., 1990) (asserting that while universality relates to humanity race by way of
contrast requires consideration of the specific). The court's language and reasoning in Hopwood
v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996) provides an illustration in the present. As to other measures
targeting communities of color see e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L. J. 187
(1997) (California Civil Rights Initiative); Ruben Garcia, Critical Race Theory and Proposition
187: The Racial Politics of Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. R. 118 (1998); Nancy
Cervantes, et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles In the Aftermath of Proposition 187, 17 CHICANOLATINO L. REV. 1 (1995). The term Euro-American references the dominant population. See In
Re Camille, 6 F. 256 (C.C.D. Or. 1880) (defining dominant population as European or white
race).
4. See, e.g., Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus: The
White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493 (1998)
(examining assumption of sameness and "why diversity is so resisted"); Seth Schiesel & Robert L.
Turna, Is Race Obsolete, BOSTON GLOBE MAG. 13, Sept. 22, 1996.
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nonetheless, are disputing Chicana/o racial identity 5 and rejecting racebased inquiries.6 In addressing the complexities of race as constructed

by mainstream law, this preliminary investigation compares the jurisprudence involving African Americans in Dred Scott v. Sandford,7 with the

jurisprudence involving Chicanas/os,8 in defense of their property interests, following the conquest of the former Mexican provinces in 1848. 9
The theoretical lens employed here draws from LatCrit Theory and its

search for "connecting anti-subordination struggles, and cultivating
5. Professor Ian Haney-Lopez reports: "It is clear that in the United States there exists no
widespread consensus that Latinos/as share a separate identity that can be specified in terms of
race, as opposed to, say, ethnicity, national origin, or culture." Professor Haney-Lopez, in
referencing a number of authors promoting a "raceless conception of Latina/o identity, observes
that there is a "pronounced resistance in the legal academy to racial conceptualizations of Latinos/
as and Latino/a subgroups." Ian F. Haney-Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race
to LatCrit Theory, 10 LA RAZA L. J. 57 (1998).
6. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanne Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further
Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647, 652 n.38 (1994); Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanne Sherry, Telling Stories Out of Law School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 807 (1993). But see, Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farberand
Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993). As to one scholar's experience with LatCrit theory and
"traditional" scholarship see Elvia R. Arriola, Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latinalo
communities Through LatCrit Theory, March, 19 CHICANo-LATINO L. REV. 1, 7 (1998)
(discussing author's "lone battle" in "trying to fill the 'objective' criteria expected of untenured
professors" and the "huge risks" exacted "when individuals like Lino Graglia signal the loss of
widespread cultural support for concept like diversity and affirmative action.").
7. 60 U.S. 393 (19 How.) (1856).
8. "Mexican nationals" refers to citizens of Mexico and "Chicana/Chicano" references
individuals of Mexican descent. Terms are used interchangeably and are commonly "selfdesignations." See GENARO M. PADILLA, My HISTORY, NOT YOURS (1993). For alternative
designators, see Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the
Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994);
Margaret Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self White Un/Braiding
Personal Experience, Latina Heritage, and Legal Socialization, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 188
(1994); ANA CASTILLO, MASSACRE OF THE DREAMERS (1994) (defining Xicanisma). Ana Castillo
asserts Xicanisma "is formed in the acknowledgement of the historical crossroad where the
creative power of woman became appropriated by male society. And woman in the flesh was
subordinated."
In the essay, the Mexican governance of the annexed territories is distinguished
from the Spanish period. Mexico declared its independence from Spain in 1821. Additionally, the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which terminated the war between the United States and Mexico
recognized those remaining in the Mexican provinces as Mexican citizens. See Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo infra note 12. Finally, the complexities of race are compounded when legal
institutions identify Chicanas/os as "white." For background on this legal designation see George
Martinez, African-Americans, Latinos, and The Construction of Race: Toward An Epistemic
Coalition, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 213 , 215 (1998) ("Legal classification impacts the
relationship between African-Americans and Mexican-Americans" . . . and creates a barrier to
coalitions with African-Americans and other non-white minorities.").
9. For accounts of the conflict between the United States and Mexico reference, see
WILLIAM H. GOETZMANN, WHEN THE EAGLE SCREAMED, THE ROMANTIC HORIZON IN AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY, 1800-1860 (1965); Lisbeth Haas, War in California,1846-1848 in CONTESTED EDEN:
CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE GOLD RUSH, 331 (Ram6n A. Guti6rrez & Richard J. Orsi ed., (1998).
See also Pico v. United States, 19 F. Cas. 590, 591 (D. Cal. 1855) (No. 11,127) (discussing "the
rights of a conquered people").
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intellectual community and progressive coalitions."' 0 From this perspective, this investigation considers one key point, namely, the citizenship
status denied one group, e.g., Dred Scott," contrasted with the purported
12
citizenship granted to another - Chicanas/os.
Upon initial examination, the jurisprudence drawn from Dred Scott
and the Chicana/o land litigation disputes appear irreconcilably different.
The issues, whether Mr. Scott could sue in federal court, whether the

Missouri Compromise was constitutional, and whether the effect of his
residing in non-slave states affected his standing in Missouri, appear to
bear little relevance to the property disputes involving people of Mexican descent. That people of Mexican descent are legally characterized
as "white" also presents analytical differences. Several commonalities,

however, surface and offer an alternative to the hegemonic amnesia of
legal histories so long missing from mainstream jurisprudence.1 3
In the first instance, the opinions consider the intersection of property law with racial considerations. In Dred Scott, the property in ques-

tion-a human being-encompassed the issue of slavery in Mr. Scott's
bid for citizenship. In the Chicana/o cases, the corresponding correlation regarding the property at issue encompassed challenges that questioned Chicana/o citizenship and their ownership of land.
A second shared point engages aspects of federal/state relations. In
10. Elizabeth M. Iglesias and Francisco V. Valdes, Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and
Class in Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice, 19
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 503 (1998).
11. The opinion reports that "neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves,
nor their descendants" could be citizens of the United States. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at
407.
12. Article IX of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo provided for the citizenship of those
choosing to remain in the annexed territories. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and
Settlement With The United States of America and the Republic of Mexico, Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., Art. IX, 9 Stat. 922, 930 [hereinafter "Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo"]. Executed in the City of Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, the Treaty's
ratification took place in Queretaro, Mexico on May 30, 1848. Its final proclamation was made on
July 4, 1848. See Hunter Miller, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Documents 122-150: 1846-1852, 5
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 207 (1937). See
also RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO, A LEGACY OF
CONFLICT (1990); ANTONIO DE LA PENA Y REYES, ALGUNOS DOCUMENTOS SOBRE EL TRATADO DE
GUADALUPE Y LA SITUACION DE MEXICO DURANTE LA INVASION AMERICANA (1930) (documents
and correspondence regarding the U. S. invasion and war between the two Republics, and the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).
13. Regarding the nature of this invisibility and LatCrit theory, see Berta E. HernandezTruyol, Building Bridges - Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and
Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994); Kevin Johnson, Los Olvidados, Images
of the Immigrant, PoliticalPower of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993
BYU L. REv. 1139; Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Indivisible People, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 965 (1995). See also RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, THE LATINO/A
CONDITION, A CRITICAL READER (1998).
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Dred Scott, the issue of diversity jurisdiction illustrates the tension

between federal/state relations and federal/state court jurisdiction. 4
Similarly, in the Chicana/o cases, the relevant federal concern included
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ("the Treaty"). 5 The Treaty established a legal relationship between the United States and people of Mexican descent whereupon its subsequent interpretation by legal
interpreters exposed several conflicts between federal and state jurisdiction levels. 16
A third commonality yields an historical time-frame in which the
Supreme Court and other federal courts heard and ruled on several opinions involving people of color.1 7 Several years before Dred Scott surfaced on the legal landscape, the legal system had generated land grant
jurisprudence involving Chicana/o claims of ownership in the annexed
territories.1 8 Justices Taney, Fields, and Daniel had all participated in
14. For a review of this conflict, see Eric T. Dean, Jr., Reassessing Dred Scott: The
Possibilitiesof Federal Power in the Antebellum Context, 60 U. CiN. L. REV. 713 (1992); Alfred
L. Brophy, Let Us Go Back and Stand Upon The Constitution: Federal- State Relations in Scott
v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192 (1990).
15.

TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO,

STAT.

922, 929.

16. United States v. Circuit Judges, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 673 (1865). See also United States v.
Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 533 (1854) (raising separation of powers and federalism
considerations). Conflicts surfaced because federal district courts did not have complete
jurisdiction over the land grant adjudication until the Act of 1860 was passed. See United States
v. De Rodriguez, 25 F. Cas. 821 (N.D. Cal. 1864).
17. For instances involving people of color and Supreme Court jurisprudence, see, for
example, Arguello v. United States, 59 U.S. (How.) 539 (1855); Choteau v. Marguerite, A
Woman of Colour, 37 U.S. 507 (1838). Federal law dictated the land grant process and a vast
number of land grant litigation shaped federal jurisprudence during this historical period. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bernal, 24 F. Cas. 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,581 (Carmen Bernal's grant
challenged as fraudulent notwithstanding confirmation of her grant); United States v. Ortega, 27
F. Cas. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 15,970) (bequest to Maria Clara Ortega and Maria Isabel Clara
Ortega from their father's 1809 San Ysidro grant); Cervantes v. United States, 5 Cas. 380 (N.D.
Cal. 1855) (No. 2560). See also United States v Chaboya, 67 U.S. 593 (2 Black.) (1862); United
States v. Gomez, 64 U.S. 326 (23 How.) (1859); Serrano v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 451
(1866).
18. The land grant cases involving United States citizens of Mexican descent are vast and
beyond the focus of this review. In sum, the land grant adjudication system outside the state level
encompassed several federal levels. For example, claimants faced the Board of Land
Commissioners charged with determining the validity of a land claim. See discussion on the
California Land Act of 1851 infra note 45. The second federal level encompassed the federal
district court system. See generally Feliz v. United States, 8 F. Cas. 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1855)
(holding performance of conditions attached to grant despite the Board of Land Commissioner's
rejection of claim). Finally, appeals at times reached the U.S. Supreme Court. See generally
Fuentes v. United States, 63 U.S. 443 (1859). For further examples see United States v. Morillo,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 706 (1863) (conflict of jurisdiction dispute); Romero v. United States, 68 U.S. (I
Wall.) 65 1863 (Innocencio, Jose, and Mariano Romero's land grant claim); United States v.
Olvero, 154 U.S. 538 (1864) (involving Los Alamos and Agua Caliente claim in Los Angeles);
Serrano v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 451 (1866); Higueros v. United States, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 827 (1864).
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generating land adjudication case law. 19 Several of the justices, moreover, had heard property dispute litigation in Louisiana and Florida,
which followed the United States' Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Lim-

its with Spain.20
Fourth, and for the purposes of the instant case, the majority's purported application of "original intent" in Dred Scott illustrates the type

of challenges confronting courts and the consequences imposed on communities of color.2 In several instances involving Chicanas/os defending their property long before Dred Scott, the Court ignored its "original
intent" interpretation that it adopted in its rejection of Mr. Scott's bid for
citizenship22 and which placed him on the outside of traditional mainstream law.2 3 Moreover, although Chicanas/os were deemed entitled to
receive the "blessings" deriving from Anglo-American law,24 most of
their property was lost within a short time frame. 5 Sustaining extensive
19. Justice Field was also a member of the California Supreme Court in which he heard and
ruled on several cases involving those of Mexican descent. For background on Justice Field,
reference Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Development in
California, 1850-1860: A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth Century
America, LAW & SOCIETY 235 (1976); Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff: The Hidden Agenda
of Stephen J. Field, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 75 (1997). For examples of Justice Field opinions see
United States v. Yorba, 68 U.S. 412 (1 Wall.) (1863) (U.S. challenge to 1846, La Sierra land grant
in Los Angeles); United States v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 352 (1863) (U.S. challenge to the
claimed ownership of an 1843 land grant); United States v. D'Aguirre, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 311
(1863) (U.S. challenge to Dofia Maria Estudillo's land grant claim).
20. See HUNTER MILLER, SPAIN: FEBRUARY TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF
THE UNITED

STATES, DOCUMENTS

41-79: 1819-35 (1933) (Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and

Limits, signed in Washington on February 22, 1819).
21. In Dred Scott, Taney reasoned "that their arguments were faithful to the original
intentions of the framers and to judicial precedent." See discussion infra pp. 26-27. See also
Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional
Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271 (1997) ("Taney and his fellow justices explicitly declared that
their arguments were faithful to the original intentions of the framers and to judicial precedent.").
22. Nor did its omission protect Mr. Scott. See discussion infra PART II.
23. See, e.g., Mar Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989) (the term "outsider" is used to avoid term "minority;" the
term "minority" contradicts "the numerical significance of the constituencies typically excluded
from jurisprudential discourse").
24. See Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicanas, Land Grant Adjudication, and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo: This Land Belongs To Me, HARv. LATINO L. REV. (forthcoming 1998)
(citing Secretary of State James Buchanan in his lobbying against a provision in the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo that would have ensured protection of Mexican-owned property). During his
lobbying in voting for the removal of the provision (Article X) Buchanan asserted that the
country's laws referred to as "blessings," would otherwise protect grantees. Hunter Miller, Treaty

of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Documents 122-150: 1846-1852, 5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ACTs OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 256 (1937) (reporting on the nature of James
Buchanan and his lobbying).
25. See Rodolfo 0. de la Garza & Karl Schmitt, Texas Land Grants & Chicano-Mexican
Relations: A Case Study, 21 LATINO AM. RES. REV. 123 (1986); Mario T. Garcia, Merchants and
Dons, San Diego's Attempt at Modernization, 1850-1860, in CARLOS E. CORTPS, MEXICANS IN
CALIFORNIA AFTER THE UNITED STATES CONQUEST,

52, 70-71 (1976). Prominent Alta California
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and irretrievable losses from erratic and arbitrary rulings, in effect,
placed those of Mexican descent as outsiders of traditional law.2 6
Other aspects of mainstream law have long contributed to the painful legacy of lynchings, segregation, poverty, and generations of unequal
treatment confronting communities of color.27 The struggles Mr. Scott
and Chicana/o land grant recipients confronted2 8 offer a perspective
from which to study and, thus, reject the racial politics of the contemporary period. In uncloaking causation strands, developed during this historical framework, a perspective grounded in the combined struggles of
subordinated communities, surfaces. Ultimately, this alternative lens
contrasts with less inclusive paradigms grounded in essentialism and
which deny the nation's complex legal histories.29
Accordingly, Part I presents a brief historical account of the land
grant period and addresses Chicana/o exclusion within the culture of
Anglo-American law. It next examines two key rulings that contextualize the status of Chicanas/os within mainstream law. Part II examines
Don Juan Bandini corroborated the loss of property resulting from Anglo-American law by
stating:
Of the lands mentioned, some have been in the quiet possession of the proprietors
and their families for forty or fifty years. On them they have reared themselves
homes-they have enclosed and cultivated fields-there they and their children
were born-and there they lived in peace and comparative plenty. But now-our
inheritance is turned to strangers-our houses to aliens. We have drunken our water
for money-our wood is sold unto us. Our necks are under persecution-we labor
and have no rest.
Id. at 71 (citing S. Cal., April 11, 1855).
26. Philip D. Ortego, The Chicano Renaissance, in LA CAUSA CHICANA, THE MOVEMENT FOR
JUSTICE, 53 (Margaret M. Mangold ed., 1971-72) ("Mexican Americans themselves were kept at
arm's length as outsiders."). As to their invisibility in law, see Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol,
Las Olvidadas-Gendered in Justice/GenderedInjustice: Latinas Fronteras and the Law, I J.
GENDER, RACE AND JUST., 355 (1998); Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, Indivisible Identities:
Culture Clashes, Confused Constructs and Reality Checks, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 199 (1998);
Ian F. Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994); Kevin R. Johnson, Los
Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and
Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139 (analyzing the vulnerability of noncitizens in the political
process).
27. For an example as to the nature of law and its use in targeting people of color see A
Blemish in Oregon History Recalled, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIOENCER, Feb. 18, 1999, at B2. Over
150 years ago, a legal measure that remained in Oregon's Constitution until 1926 barred blacks
from entering the Oregon territory. Several Midwestern states including Michigan and Indiana
had also passed laws restricting African Americans from entering their state.
28. The land grant adjudication conflict is not confined to the past. See Sam Howe Verhovek,
South Texas Families' Land Fight A Battlefor the Ages, FT. WORTH-STAR TEL., July 20, 1997, at
57; Alliance of Descendants of Tex. Land Grants v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 837 (1993) (heirs
and successor to land grant recipients seeking compensation for appropriation of 12 million acres
of land without compensation).
29. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1992).
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Dred Scott and the Court's shifting of constitutional "norms" which
governed the Chicana/o land grant construct. The goal of this section
reveals the outsider status of Chicanas/os and African Americans within

the hegemony of mainstream law. In conclusion, this essay rejects
universality,3" which denies our racial identity and its attendant correla-

tive in looking for our silence by rejection of race-based knowledge and
31
scholarship.
PART I.

A

HISTORICAL CONSTRUCT: CHICANAS/OS AND EXCLUSION

In the struggle to give voice to our experiences, working class people of color encounter multiple mechanisms meant to silence us. More
particularly, we encounter silencing when our voices speak of resistance
to injustice - both against ourselves and our peoples. And yet, colonization is the historical legacy that continues to haunt us, even today.
The ability to effectively promote justice requires vigilance so that we
may immunize ourselves against the paralysis that comes from being
silenced.3 2
Prior to the United States' conquest of the Mexican Republic, men
33
and women owned and operated rural enterprises of various sizes.
Recipients of land grant parcels, individuals and groups, settled and cultivated key regions throughout the present American Southwest.3 4 Yet
many of their voices are not heard in mainstream law. Maria Concepcion
Valencia de Rodriguez' attempts, for example, to defend her Rancho
30. See, e.g., Wallerstein, supra note 3, at 4. This investigation rejects concepts of
essentialism. "The concept of essentialism refers to the issues raised by false univeralisms,
identity splitting, the assumption of natural principles, and a form of reductionism." False
universalisms refer to "overgeneralizations or unstated reference points [that] implicitly attribute
to all members of a group the characteristics of individuals who are dominant in that group."
Theresa Raffaele Jefferson, Toward A Black Lesbian Jurisprudence, 18 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
263 (1998). Professor Berta Esperanza Hemdndez-Truyol asserts "Normativity, in all its forms be it maleness, whiteness, or straightness - creates a false sense of universality of what is right,
desired, and desirable. At one time, this idea was used to support racial subordination." See Berta
Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, Indivisible Identities: Culture Clashes, Confused Constructs and
Reality Checks, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 199, 214 (1998).
31. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARMER AND SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON (1997)

(challenging methods employed in critical legal scholarship); Haney-Lopez, supra, note 5.
32. See Teresa C6rdova, Power and Knowledge: Colonialism in the Academy, in LIVING
CHICANA THEORY, 17 (Carla Trujillo ed., 1998).
33. See JUAN GOMEZ QUZNONES, ROOTS OF CHICANO POLITICS, 1600-1940 (1994).
34. Empresario grants entitled groups to live on large tracts of land. For examples of legal
assessments disallowing communal rights under Anglo-American law, see United States v.
Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278 (1897). Communal living was valued as a way of life because it permitted
groups of grantees living in semi-arid tracts to share scarce water resources. Compare with
EDWARD T. PRICE, DIVIDING THE LAND, EARLY AMERICAN BEGINNINGS OF OUR PRIVATE
PROPERTY MOSAIC (1995) (American colonists holding property communally).
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San Francisquito remains excluded from academic investigations.35
Holding possession of the Rancho exposed her to a new legal regime
resulting from the conquest and obligated her to confirm the validity of
her grant, years after she had long settled on the property.
Through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, that formally terminated
the war between the two Republics, the United States contractually
promised to protect the property interests of those remaining within the
annexed territories, not unlike that belonging to Maria Valencia de Rodriguez. 36 The Treaty, inter alia, additionally granted citizenship to the
conquered population.37 As the terms of the conquest, moreover, Chicanas/os were granted citizenship status. Notwithstanding the promises
and constitutional considerations extended to those of Mexican descent,
the law accelerated the irrecoverable losses of their property interests.
Through a series of irreconcilable legal principles that confronted Chicanas/os in defending their property interests, the legal order promoted
land dispossession. Denying their former standing as rural property
owners in the period before the conquest, Chicana/o ownership of rural
property persists in its absence into the present period.38
While Chicana/o land struggles are well-documented outside of
law, their existing impoverished conditions in rural regions, resulting
from the loss of their property interests, provides systemic evidence of
the hegemonic manipulation of mainstream law. In essence, the fragile
existence of Chicanas/os within the rural economy reflects the capricious and arbitrary nature of law and its application to people of color.3 9
35. United States v. De Rodriguez, 25 F. Cas. 821 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 14,950).
36. Article VIII, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 12 at 929-30. The covenant also
provides that "The present owners, the heirs of these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire
said property by contract, shall enjoy with respect to it guaranties equally amply as if the same
belonged to citizens of the United States." Id.
37. Article IX, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 12 at 930. The covenant also
provides that they would be "protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and
secured in the free exercise of their religion without restriction." See discussion infra. Finally,
earlier drafts of the Treaty show that its negotiators' intentions included citizenship as a treaty
covenant. See, e.g., Senate Executive Documents, 30' Cong., IVSess., 1847-1848, No. 20 (letter
to the Nicholas Trist, the U.S. treaty negotiator from the treaty negotiators in Mexico).
38. Less than 21,000 Chicanos own rural land. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS
OF AGRICULTURE, U.S. DATA CHARACTERISTICS OF OPERATOR AND TYPE OPERATED BY BLACK

AND OTHER RACES, 1992, 1987, and 1982 (1995). Additionally, rural Black farm owners are also
disallowed rural landowner status with specific charges brought against the Department of
Agriculture for civil rights violations. See, e.g., Government in Disgrace: The Last Plantation,
THE ECONOMIST, March 13, 1999, at 35. In 1920, approximately 925,000 farmers owned and
operated agricultural enterprises. At present, less than 20,000 own rural enterprises. The farmers
are asserting discrimination in that the Farmers Home Administration did not extend loans and
credit comparable to the dominant population. See id.
39. The absence of diversity in rural property ownership reflects the role of law in displacing
Chicana/o and African American property owners from their agricultural enterprises. The
experience of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union in organizing sharecroppers, provides yet
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A.

gQui Pasa Aqui?4 ° Has Anyone Seen the Constitution?

The cession of territory from one sovereign to another passes the
sovereign only and does not interfere with private property.4 1
Through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States promised to protect the property interests of those remaining in the annexed
territories. Additionally, in referencing the Treaty of Amity, Settlement,
and Limits between Spain and the United States involving land grants in
Florida and Louisiana, the Supreme Court had long ago ruled that "the
obligation imposed by the principles of international law to respect property rights within annexed territory is substantially that recognized by
the treaty. '"42
Finally, the Constitution's drafters in plain language, tell us that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the
Contrary notwithstanding.4 3
Case law further emphasizes that: "A treaty lawfully entered into, stands
on the same footing of supremacy as does the Constitution . . .of the
United States." 44 While De Geofroy v. Riggs, in its analysis of treaty
law, reports that the Constitution's supremacy "directs courts to give
them [treaties] legal effect,"4 it mirrors the Constitution's language enumerated above.
Notwithstanding the promises enumerated in the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo and its supremacy as mandated by the United States
Constitution, Congress promulgated the California Land Act of 1851
another example of how diversity in the agricultural marketplace disallows inclusion of people of
color. See generally H.L. MITCHELL, MEAN THINGS HAPPENING IN THIS LAND (1979) (Union
members and supporters subjected to arrests, imprisonment on false charges, evictions, and

murder). For an example of Chicanas/os and their organizing attempts in Texas see Medrano v.
Allee, 416 U.S. 802 (1973) (arrests, unlawful imprisonment, physical assaults, and other forms of
intimidation of union organizers).
40. The English translation meaning "What is happening here?"
41. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
42. Soulard v. United States, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 511 (1830) ("Even if the treaty by which
Louisiana was acquired had not contained stipulation by the United States that the inhabitants of
the ceded territory should be protected in the free enjoyment of their property, the United States as
a just nation would have held that principle equally sacred."); see United States v. Percheman, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (The cession of territory from one sovereign to another passes the
sovereignty only and does not interfere with private property).
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
44. Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co, 158 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1946); See also Atocha's
Adm'r v. United States, 8 Ct. Cl. 427 (1872).
45. De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890).
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(CLA).4 6 In contradiction to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the CLA
shifted the burden of proof onto the grantees to demonstrate the validity
of their claims of property ownership.4 7 In essence, the CLA defied precedent and denied the literal wording of the Supremacy Clause of the

Constitution While it is within the jurisdiction of Congress to fine-tune
treaties, a treaty's substantive revision requires the consent of the signa-

tories to avoid violations of a negotiated agreement.48 By shifting the
burden onto grantees to demonstrate ownership, Congress violated the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and therefore re-defined its substantive
meaning.4 9 The legislation ultimately facilitated the disenfranchisement

of Chicana/os from their property interests.
Outside of direct litigation, Chicana/o land dispossession also
resulted from the use of law as a weapon, and joining with extra-legal
methods, forced alienation. Amoldo De Leon and Kenneth Stewart contend, for example, that Tejanos lost their lands through "a combination
46. That each and every person claiming lands in California by virtue of any right or title
derived from the Spanish or Mexican government, shall present the same to the said
commissioners when sitting as a board, together with such documentary evidence and testimony
of witnesses as the said claimant relies upon in support of such claims. Section 8. The Act of
Congress of March 3, 1851, entitled "AN ACT TO ASCERTAIN AND SETrLE THE PRIVATE LAND
CLAIMS IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA." 9 STAT. 631 (1851). In New Mexico, see Statutes At
Large, CHAP. 539, AN ACT To ESTABLISH A COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS AND TO PROVIDE
FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS IN CERTAIN STATES AND TERRITORIES, MAR. 3,

1891.
47. See California Land Act § 11.The largest number of land grant adjudication occurred
under the California Land Act, but other land acts also required grantees to demonstrate proof of
ownership. This presented further difficulties as in New Mexico, which first required
congressional determination of validity and/or until the existence of other states. For an example
of this history in case law, see United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 291 (1897).
48. As to whether a treaty is self-executing and congressional action regarding signed
treaties, see Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695 (1995). As to further analysis on the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo see Symposium
Issue, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 5 S.W. U. J. INT'L TRADE AM. 1 (1998).
49. The adverse conditions facing the landowners resulted in an appeal in which they
declared:
In view of the doleful litigation proposed by the general Government against all the
land owners in California in violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the
law of nations, which year by year became more costly and intolerable in view of
the repeated falsehoods and calumnies circulated by the public press against the
validation of our titles and the justice which supports us in this interminable
litigation and which equally influences the tribunals of justice and prejudices our
character and our dearest rights, in view of the injustices which have accumulated
against us to carry out a general confiscation of our properties; and especially to
adopt the most efficient means to assure the abrogation of the existing law which
holds all titles acquired from the former government to be fraudulent and which
were guaranteed to us by the treaty.
Mario T. Garcia, Merchants and Dons, supra note 25 at 70-71, citing ROBERT CLASS CLELAND,
THE CATTLE ON A THOUSAND HILLS (1951).

ON THE COMPLEXITIES OF RACE

1999]

of methods including, litigation, chicanery, robbery, fraud, and threat."50
Extra-legal methods resulted in the Cortina Rebellion in South Texas
and the El Paso Salt War in the 1970s, in which the Texas Rangers

challenged Chicana/o use of the region's natural resources as means to
intimidate Chicanas/os off their property and from accessing communal
51

resources.

In failing to protect Chicanas/os, the United States breached its
obligations under federal and international law. Failing to protect Chicanas/os, also makes evident that the federal authority to control public
lands yielded to state actions in which the actions of squatters, agricul-

tural interests, and other public law encroached on Chicana/o land.
Legislation that excluded Chicanas/os from the franchise and its

impact on their standing in mainstream culture is examined next.
DE LA GUERRA

"When the United States acquired Mexico's northern frontier, the
mestizo ancestry of the conquered Mexicans placed them in ambiguous

social and legal positions. 52
The above ambiguity draws primarily from Euro-American treatment and hostility towards Chicanas/os. Examples of the role of racism
and its numerous instances, which faced Chicanas/os remain beyond the
scope of this preliminary essay. Nonetheless, Chicanas/os confronted a
hierarchy of laws that sought to exclude them from assimilating within
the mainstream culture. Stereotypes targeted them on the basis of their

race by those seeking to benefit from that forced exclusion. Building
from these myths, facilitated a legal culture that directly disallowed

them the full attributes of citizenship status.
One of the earliest instances involved Pablo de la Guerra, a delegate to the 1849 Constitutional Convention in California,5 3 who won an
50. Arnold De Leon & Kenneth L. Stewart, Lost Dreams and Found Fortunes: Mexican and
Anglo Immigrants into South Texas, 1850-1900, 14 W. H. Q. 58 (1983).
51. ARNOLDO DE LEON, THEY CALLED THEM GREASERS (1983).
52. Martha Menchaca, Chicano Indianism: A HistoricalAccount of Racial Repression in the
United States, 20 AM. ETHNOLOGEST, 583, 584 (1993).
53. See People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311 (1870). For yet another example of
discrimination see the realm of miscegenation laws impacting Chicanas/os. As an example in
California years after the Conquest see Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). In the instant case,
the County Clerk in Los Angeles refused to issue a marriage license to Andrea D. Perez and
Sylvester S. Davis, Jr. The clerk denied the license because state law provided that no license
"may be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person with a Negro, mulatto, Monglian or
member of the Malay race." While the California Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional, the opinion reports on the history of California's first miscegenation legislation
from 1850. The decision is also valuable for showing the nature of how law socially constructed
the relationship between African-Americans and Chicanas/os in disallowing their marriages and to
how people of color were perceived. In citing to precedent from Georgia, the state, for example,
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election to the bench. 4 As the nephew of Mariano Vallejo, De La
Guerra belonged to one of the well-established families in the region."
Notwithstanding the history of his family, his connections, and class
standing, De La Guerra, confronted litigation that sought to disqualify
him from the bench and which culminated in the case, People v. De La
Guerra.
The facts of the case reveal that a judicial election in 1869 elected
De La Guerra judge of the First Judicial District. Notwithstanding the
election, De La Guerra faced a challenge to his right to that position on
the basis that he was not a citizen of the United States. The allegations
relied on the legislation passed on April 20, 1863, providing that "no
person shall be eligible for the office of District Judge, who shall not
have been a citizen of the United States, and a resident of this State for
two years." The challengers contended that the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo did not permit citizenship but instead required an Act of Congress. Without such legislation, the challengers argued, De La Guerra
violated the requirements of the statute.
The court relied on the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and its Article
VIII and declared that the "Treaty was intended to operate directly, and
of itself to fix the status of those inhabitants. ...
" The court further reasoned that "the political rights are not essential to citizenship" and ultimately ruled that the "respondent is clearly a citizen of the United
States." Outside of this ruling, the conquest of the former Mexican provinces recognized its former residents as citizens.
Before, during Treaty negotiations, and up to the Treaty's ratification, military and other governmental officials represented citizenship to
those residing in the conquered territories. Congress, nonetheless,
changed the substantive and literal meaning of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and consequently hindered the attributes deriving from
citizenship.
Finally, one other factor bears on the legislative history of the type
of legal structures impacting Chicanas/os during this period in time.
Scholar Leonard Pitt, writes that the Americans "saw the advantage of
argued that "The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but is always productive of
deplorable results. Our daily observation shows us, that the offspring of these unnatural
connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in physical development
and strength, to the full blood of either race." Id. at 22, quoting Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324

(1869).
54. See

Pri,

A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
1848-1890, at 43-46.
55. Mariano Vallejo, was the former Director of Colonization in Alta California whose harsh
treatment by American officials is well documented as initiating the Bear Flag Rebellion and
LEONARD

THE DECLINE OF THE CALIFORNIOS,

SPANISH SPEAKING CALIFORNIANS,

conquest of the Mexican province. See id. For an example of Vallejo's defense and loss of his
property interest see United States v. Vallejo, 28 F. Cas. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 16, 818).
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letting Californios control Californios, but they would give the nativeborn no license to govern Yankees. 56 Shortly after the Conquest, the
army "sanctioned a constitutional convention. This move in the direction of democracy unfortunately released the Californios to the flood
tide of gringo hostility." Those elected to serve at the convention
included Manuel Dominguez, who although a Mexican mestizo, was
recognized by American law as a "half-breed." 5 7 Notwithstanding such
characterization under American ideology, Mexican law and the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo recognized the indigenous population as Mexican
citizens. Dominguez, however, even as a well-established California
elite, faced proposed legislation limiting the franchise to "white males."
This would have barred him from signing the state's constitution.
During the constitutional convention, in opposing the legislation,
De La Guerra argued that "many Californios were dark-skinned, and
that to disfranchise them would be tantamount to denying them a part of
their citizenship as granted by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo." 8
Ultimately, the proposed legislation was changed to permit "enfranchising certain Indians."
Other legislation diminishing the attributes of citizenship is underscored when considering Chicanas/os defense of their property interests.
(b)

Fremont v. United States

Fremont v. United States is the key litigation in which the land
grant process and the United States Supreme Court first analyzed the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and that sets the framework for the purposes of this review. Fremont is also critical because it marks the beginning of the end for Chicana/o land grantees through precedent ultimately
contrary to constitutional, treaty law, international law, and the dictates
of the California Land Act of 1851.
Fremont v. United States involved an instigator of the United States
war conflict who sought confirmation of a purported land grant in an
opinion authored by Chief Justice Taney.5 9 In a note attached to a subsequent case following the Fremont decision, the Court informs that:
56.
57.
58.
59.

PITr, supra note 54, at 42-47.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1854). Mariposas was ultimately held

as a grant of ten sitios "north of a river, within the Sierra Nevada in the east part of Merced, on the
west." United States v. Cameron, 21 P. 177, 178 (1889). As to the nature of Fremont's spying
activities on behalf of the United States see A. BROOKE CARUSO, THE MEXICAN SPY COMPANY,
UNITED STATES COVERT OPERATIONS IN MEXICO, 1845-1848 (1991). The author provided an
interpretation of the United States and its covert operations in California and Fremont's
involvement and its secret nature are especially illuminating. See id. at 80-137.
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Fremont was critical because it was among the earliest of the cases
decided by a United States district court on appeal from the board of
commissioners. It was the first in which the Supreme Court
announced the principles by which this class of cases was to be
decided. It has, therefore, remained the most important and the leading case on this branch of the law, and has exercised a controlling
60
influence on all subsequent decisions of this court.
The corresponding issues involving Chicana/o-owned property generated a vast realm of law but which, nonetheless, remains primarily
excluded from legal study. The value of the instant case, moreover, and
its impact on Chicanas/os, provides evidence in which the Court "reconciled" the laws in force, with adverse consequences for Chicanas/os.
Ruling otherwise, would have recognized the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and the legal process required from the various land acts.
In disallowing the legal process and the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo to govern, the land grant adjudication process effectively
changed the burden onto grantees to demonstrate the validity of their
claim. Determining the validity of a claim of land ownership involving
a land grant from the Mexican period, required a court to consider and
apply "the law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the Government from which the claim is derived, the principles of equity, and
(prior) decisions."' 6 Adhering the above principles to the instant case,
required the Supreme Court to follow Mexican law from which the
claim derived.62 Mexican law obligated grantees to settle and cultivate
the land within a one-year period. 63 The conditions attached to the original grantee's claim, moreover, disallowed the original grantee from
transferring the land without obtaining the permission of Mexican
officials. 64
The material facts of the original grant indicate Juan Alvarado, the
original grantee, neither settled nor cultivated the land within the one60. United States v. Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. 266, 272 (D. Ca. 1857) (No. 14,713).
61. The Land Act of 1851, § II provides:

in deciding on the validity of any claim brought before them under the provisions of
this act, shall be governed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the law of nations,
the laws, usages, and customs of the government from which the claim is derived,
the principles of equity, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, so far as they are applicable.

Id.
62. See generally United States v. Perot, 98 U.S. 428, 430 (1878) ("The laws of Mexico ...

were the laws not of a foreign, but of an antecedent government.

.

.Its laws are not deemed

foreign laws.").
63. An easy source of the Mexican colonization laws can be found in Cessna v. United States,
169 U.S. 165, 171 (1898).
64. See Fremont, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 566.
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year period.6 5 Alvarado, moreover, transferred the property to Fremont
without the consent of the Mexican government. Finally, Fremont
although claiming ownership of the land grant, lacked documentation as
to the purported alienation of the grantee's interest.6 6 Applying the law
literally, and as intended, therefore, rendered Fremont's claim nothing
but unlawful, illegal, and in violation of Mexican land grant procedures
and law.67

Fremont's lack of proof, evidence, and the invalidity of the original
land grant, nonetheless, did not preclude the Court from ruling in his
favor. The Court reasoned, inter alia, that the above did not bar an

American citizen from purchasing property. Evidently, citizenship status
permitted certain privileges that allowed skirting the Constitution and
falling beyond its intent and design depending on the whim of the Court.
It further rendered the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, meaningless without an act of Congress and/or the consent of the Mexican Republic during its negotiations. 68 Accordingly, the Court's holding privileged
Fremont with a gold mine and land of inestimable worth.69
At the state level in land grant adjudication hearings, the Fremont
ruling caused, Judge Murray in a dissent to declare:
At the risk of exposing myself to the ridicule or censure of many, for
what may be considered temerity on my part in questioning the
soundness of these decisions, I cannot refrain from the opinion that
in these cases [land grant adjudication cases] the Supreme Court [has]
taken a new departure, and entirely disregarded their previous
decisions. 7"
The Supreme Court, in distinguishing Fremont's claim of ownership

from the legal process, resulted in allowing secondary evidence (parole
evidence) to prove a claim and through this ruling introduced instability
in law. 7 1 The ripples and residue from Fremont thereafter, produced
65. See id.
66. This is a legal point that did not apply to grantees of Mexican descent. See, e.g., Peralta
v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434 (1865).
67. See Fremont, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 566.
68. See, e.g., Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 239 (1889) (observing courts failing to
follow the Treaty).
69. "It was vital for Fremont to win early confirmation for Mariposa because great quantities

of gold were being extracted from it by squatters."

PAUL GATES, LAND AND LAW IN CALIFORNIA

75 (1991).
70. Gunn v. Bates, 6 Cal. 261, 263 (1856), cited in Donald J. Pisini, Squatter Law In
California, 25 W. HIST. Q. 285, 277 (1994). (Referencing Ritchie v. U.S., 17 (533 (1854)).
71. See Fremont, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 565. See also United States v. Reading, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 1 (1855). For cases involving a wide realm of contrasting Chicana/o attempts to protect
their property interests see Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Edge of a Naked Knife, Chicanalo Land
Tenure in the Agrarian Domain, 4 MICH. J.. RACE & L. 1 (1998). For other accounts of Chicanas/
Chicanos, see Richard D. Garcia & Todd Howland, Determining the Legitimacy of Spanish Land
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arbitrary rulings, and that further governed the land grant cases, accelerated property losses, and denied Chicanas/os the benefit of the attributes

extended to other citizens, such as extended to Fremont and other nonChicana/o grantees. 72
Thereafter, a number of arbitrary key rulings varied the standard of
proof in claims of ownership status depending on whether the grantee
was a non-Chicana/o. 73 In some instances, for example, proof of residing
on the grant in undisturbed possession, unlike Fremont, who had neither
settled nor cultivated the tract as required by Mexican law, failed to
protect a grantee.7 4 Also unlike Fremont, Chicanas/os who provided

documentary proof of a land grant confronted challenges to the authority
of Mexican officials to grant them the tract at issue. In other instances,
Chicanas/os that lacked documentation of a granted tract charged American officials with the destruction of land grant documents." For example, Fremont's actions and his testimony in yet other land grant
adjudication, informs that he had gathered land grant documents during
the Bear Flag Rebellion, but thereafter he alleged that he had lost them
"in the mountains. 7 6
In the New Mexico territories, the attorney general re-wrote Mexican law by omitting key legal rules that governed land grant petitions
and procedures. The missing rules benefited the United States with legal
presumptions that otherwise defined the land grant process under MexiGrants in Colorado: Conflicting Values, Legal Pluralism, and Demystification of the Sangre de
CristolRael Cases, 16 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 39 (1995); Frederico M. Cheever, A New
Approach to Spanish and Mexican Land Grants and the Public Interest Doctrine: Defining the
Property Interest Protectedby the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1364 (1986);
Placido Gomez, The History and Adjudication of the Common Lands of Spanish and Mexican
Land Grants, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1039 (1985).
72. For example, although the claimant had committed an act of treason against the Mexican
Republic by joining forces with American rebels in the conquest even after he became a Mexican
citizen, the Supreme Court allowed confirmation of his claim. See United States v. Reading, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1855).
73. Some authors assert the legal process was fair. See e.g., PAUL GATES, LAND AND LAW IN
CALIFORNIA: ESSAYS ON LAND POLICY (1991).

74. See Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434 (1865); John S. Hittell, Mexican Land
Claims in California, in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN AMERICANS 271 (asserting

that the Peralta grant "had title according to the Mexican law . . ."). In part because of the
distances and lack of communication difficulties between Alta California and the Mexican
interior, the custom and practice of Mexican law also allowed grantees to occupy the grant before
formal processing was completed. See United States v. Carrillo, 25 F. Cas. 312 (N.D. Cal. 1855)
(No. 14,737) (reporting that grantees were permitted to sow and build a house before completion
of petition process).
75. See generally United States v. Pendell, 185 U.S. 189 (1902) (during American occupation
of El Paso del Norte, military personnel destroyed documents).
76. United States v. Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. 266, 267 (D.C. Cal. 1859) (No. 14,713) The Bear
Flag Rebellion is recognized as initiating the Conquest of Alta California. For an account of the
Bear Flag Rebellion see PIrr, supra note 54, at 27.
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can law. Land grant scholar Malcolm Ebright reports that the Supreme
Court, nonetheless, relied on the text in its land grant decisions in determining whether a grantee of Mexican ancestry had demonstrated the
validity of their claim.7 7
Failure to demonstrate the "validity" of a claim of ownership
defaulted the property to the public domain. 78 Yet without protecting
Chicanas/os and their property, public law brought other pressures from
third parties with intentions to procure Chicana/o property. Seeking preemption claims, squatters and jumpers, for example, targeted Chicana/o
79
owned land without regard to its owners or possessors in interest.
Legal scholar Christian Fritz illustrates:
Squatterism posed a final source of difficulty in the struggle
over San Francisco land ...
Society was divided into three classes; land grabbers, those that had
grants for the lands and believed they were the owners; the squatters,
who knowing they had no title, would take possession of lots and
hold them by masking improvements. . .; [and] the jumpers, who
stood ready to ignore all law either of strict title or prior possession,
and to intrude themselves, either by force, stealth or fraud, into
another man's possessions and despoil him of improvements. 8 °
Fritz further provides that:
Both lot holders and grantees shared a common enemy in the form of
settlers and squatters. The squatters were motivated by the prospect
of gaining valuable city land by settling upon it and then filing a
preemption claim under federal law. The logistics of this process
required a rejection of the pueblo title with the implication that such
land was part of the public domain.
While some individuals showed a willingness to abide by the federal
preemption laws, many squatters made little distinction between the
lots held under grants or sales and the land that the city claimed under
its pueblo title.8 1
Outside of squatters, grantees sustained further challenges from
United States attorneys even in cases where grantees received confirmed claims. In summary, although disallowing the intent and lit77. MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO (1994).
78. California Land Act of 1851, § 13 (all land claims deemed invalid and not presented to be
taken as public lands).

79. See Christian G. Fritz, Politics And The Courts: The Struggle Over Land In San
Francisco 1846-1866, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 127 (1986); see also Charles W. McCurdy,
Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Development in California, 1850-1866: A Case Study of
Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth Century America, LAW & SOCIETY 235 (Winter
1996).
80. Fritz, supra note 79, at 135 n. 37, citing JUDGE R.F. PECKHAM, AN EVENTFUL LIFE 33.
81. Fritz supra note 79, at 135.
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eral meaning of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the process
employed in American law was deemed "fair" to the claimants with
this perception defining the status quo.8"

Thus, a body of federal law and shifting judicial "norms" defined
the meaning of property "rights" for citizens of Mexican descent. This
jurisprudence, moreover, underscores the contextual legal landscape
foreshadowing Mr. Scott's claims in his bid for freedom. The Court's
analysis ultimately highlights hegemonic manipulations regarding the
legal treatment of people of color.83
In sum, although international negotiations and a treaty defined a

legal relationship between Chicanas/os and the United States, legal institutional structures ostracized them as outsiders. This contextual framework permits yet another lens in which to examine Mr. Scott's bid for
freedom.
PART II.

DRED

Scorr v.

SANDFORd

84

The Dred Scott case was probably the most important case in the
history of the Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed, it was probably the most important constitutional case in the history of any nation
82. PAUL GATES, LAND AND LAW IN CALIFORNIA: ESSAYS ON LAND POLICY (1991).
83. Although not encompassing a land grant litigation, the California Supreme Court in 1948
in an opinion disallowing a Chicana and African American to obtain a marriage license, declared:
"For many years progress was slow in the dissipation of the insecurity that haunts racial
minorities, for there are many who believe that their own security depends on its maintenance.
Out of earnest belief, or out of irrational fears, they reason in a circle that such minorities are
inferior in health, intelligence, and culture, and that this inferiority proves the need of the barriers
of race prejudice." Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d, 198 P.2d 17, 26-27 (Cal. 1948). In the opinion,
the court responds to the State's argument contending that "Negroes, and impliedly the other races
specified [in the legislation], are inferior mentally to Caucasians" with the following reasoning:
"It is true that, in the United States, catalogues of distinguished people list more
Caucasians than members of other races. It cannot be disregarded, however, that
Caucasians are in the great majority and have generally had a more advantageous
environment, and that the capacity of the members to contribute to a nation's culture
depends in large measure on how freely they may participate in that culture. There
is no scientific proof that one race is superior to another in native ability.
Id. at 24-25.
84. The literature on the instant case is vast and beyond the purposes of this review. As to
how the decision is characterized see Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the
Politics of Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (1996). As to its controversy see Mark A. Graber,
Desperately Ducking Slavery; Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST.
COMMENT 271 (1997) (providing "Commentators across the political spectrum describe Dred
Scott as 'the worst constitutional decision of the nineteenth century,' 'the worst atrocity in the
Supreme Court's history,' 'the most disastrous opinion the Supreme Court has ever issued,' a
'ghastly error,' a 'tragic failure to follow the terms of the Constitution,' 'a gross abuse of trust,' 'a
lie before God,' and 'judicial review at its worst.'"). As to how the decision can be used to
encourage intellectual debate for students resisting assertions of unequal treatment see Jane
Larson, A House Divided: Using Dred Scott To Teach Conflict of Laws, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 577

(1996).
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and any court. But most of us have little if any sense of what it means or
was even about."8 5
While the orbit of its constitutional importance is beyond the focus
of this preliminary essay, the instant case yields critical insight and evidence.86 And while we might not know "what it means or was even

about" we are quite aware of what the decision accomplished. As an
example, Derrick Bell, Jr., argues that Justice Taney's "well-documented argument as to the status of black people in this country stands

as an irrefutable testament to the extension of the Nation's belief in the
inferiority of blacks and the degree to which those beliefs had been
inculcated into the laws of the land."'87 Accordingly, the case provides a
valuable tool in examining the status of people of color within the
hegemony of mainstream law.

The issues before the Court involved: (a) whether Mr. Scott could
sue in federal court; (b) whether the Missouri Compromise was constitutional; and (c) whether the effect of his residing in non-slave states
affected his standing in Missouri. The issue as to the constitutionality of
the Missouri Compromise was critical because slavery was not recognized in the former Mexican provinces. 88 In rejecting his claim for citizenship, the Supreme Court's decision accordingly rendered Mr. Scott
outside of traditional mainstream law, therefore, denying him standing

to sue in federal court.
In comparing the relevancy of Dred Scott with the Mexican cases,
for the purpose of this review, shows the majority's deference to the
Constitution and "original intent" analysis; although, this reverence is

missing from the Chicana/o cases.89 Chief Justice Taney, for example,
tells us "that their arguments were faithful to the original intentions of
85. Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case With Notes on Affirmative Action, The Right to Die
& Same-Sex Marriage, I GREEN BAG 2d 39 (1997) (asserting "this was one of the first selfconsciously 'originalist' opinions from the Supreme Court. On this issue, the Court spoke for its
understanding of what the framers believed."). The competing constitutional theories arising from
Dred Scott are beyond the purposes of this preliminary essay.
86. See Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of Law, 20 HAMLINE
L. REV 1, 11 (1996) ("Perhaps no legal case in American history is as famous -or as infamous as Dred Scott v. Sandford. Few cases were as politically divisive when they were decided; few
have taken on such symbolic meaning.").
87. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 2 (1993).
88. This further affected ownership of property in states, not unlike California, that limited the
franchise to "white males." See supra notes 53-55.
89. "Proponents of original intent analysis argue that the Court must interpret the Constitution
according to the intentions of the framers. They claim that their approach eliminates personal
preference from judicial interpretation." Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the
Politics of Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (1996). Compare with McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316 (U.S. 1819) ( "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding ... intended
to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.).
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the framers and to judicial precedent." 90 In considering whether Mr.
Scott's class, as enumerated in the plea for abatement, constituted "constituent members of this sovereignty," the Chief Justice declared:
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution,
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.
On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate
and inferior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant
race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held
the power and Government might choose to grant them. 9 '
Based on original intent, as Taney interpreted the Constitution at this
point in time, it provides that "the duty of the Court is, to interpret the
instrument they have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the
subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to the true intent and
meaning when it was adopted."9 2 The Constitution, the court declared
"speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and
intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers
and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States." 93
The Court's resistance against banning a congressional act that
would have challenged slavery, furthermore, shows its purported regard
of property rights not made evident for grantees of Mexican descent in
land grant adjudication. 94 In their decision, Taney, Daniel and Catron
declared that "laws banning slavery in the territories... were particularly
egregious violations of property rights because such measures unconstitutionally gave one class of citizens the right to the exclusive use of
jointly-owned American possessions." The Court without a doubt had
90. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
91. Id. 404-05.
92. Id. at 393. Compare with Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1854), in
which the court takes liberty with the rules in force as provided in the various land acts and the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
93. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
94. Id.
The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and
property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United States, in every State that
might desire it, for twenty years. And the Government in express terms is pledged
to protect it in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in
plain words-too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the
Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which
entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other
description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of
guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.
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to have considered and factored into their ruling the fact that the former
Mexican territories did not recognize slavery. To the detriment of Mr.
Scott and his claim for citizenship status, furthermore, this purported
high regard for constitutional standards and perceived norms also benefited non-claimants of color and disallowed Chicana/o grantees equal
consideration. In sum, extending a privilege limited primarily to the
dominant population.
Extending beyond the Dred Scott decision, instances from white
supremacists targeting Blacks, lynchings, segregation, denial of the right
to vote, and other forms of institutional racism speak to the legacy of
exclusion and its connection to law. In its totality, legal and extra-legal
methods additionally disallowed equal treatment and placed yet further
incomprehensible burdens on African-American communities.
SUMMARY

One of the first things we need to do in order to refuse to be colonized is to detect the mechanisms by which they attempt to silence us.
They attempt to define what constitutes legitimate and appropriate forms
of resistance. When they tell us how to behave, they are using mechanisms to silence us, mechanisms to keep us from effectively resisting
against our dehumanization. 95
In comparing the two forms of jurisprudence involving our communities of Mexican and African descent, the purpose of this preliminary
investigation is not to collapse the histories of both groups into one false
norm. Nonetheless, a body of scholarship and legislation is denying our
ethnicity and cultural heritage and law's linkages to the subordination of
marginalized communities. In the war over knowledge, its purpose
underscores the extent to which legal history remains imprecise. This
results from inconsistent and arbitrary holdings adversely impacting our
communities. Left to mainstream theory, the circumstances in which law
primarily privileged the dominant culture and its connection to other
subordinated struggles fail to reveal the manipulation of poorly defined
legal "standards." Chicana scholar, Teresa C6rdova, tells us that,
"Despite claims of universalist objective truth, power and knowledge are
intimately connected. 96 She urges that:
Our presence, as working-class people of color (especially women of
color), in an institution which values itself on its elitist criteria for
admission, forces the debates and challenges previously sacred
canons of objective truth. Our presence, therefore, and the issues we
raise, threaten the class legitimation function of the University. It is
95. See C6rdova, supra note 32, at 38.

96. Id. at 18.
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probably for this reason that our presence here is so complex-and so
important. 97

LatCrit theory, as an alternative, rejects exclusionary and universal language and its attendant demands for our silence.
Examinations of legal history dispels "previously sacred canons of
objective truth" 98 showing how privilege accrued by our forced invisibility in law. Prior "sacred canons of objective truth" nonetheless, are resurfacing not unlike anti-Affirmative Action rulings and repressive
measures that are eroding the very few civil rights extended to communities of color. Within institutions of higher education, beneficiaries of
privileges derived from their dominant status while enjoying the positive
attributes of citizenship, assert "diversity is not essential to education."
Its consequences, generating harmful circumstances for future
generations. 99
Historical legal evidence furthermore, exposes the privileges
extended landowners of the dominant population. This evidence of disparate treatment, nonetheless, is not accessed in legal education and
study, thereby limiting race-based inquiries to the margins of investigations and legal training. Left to ride the margins of legal inquiry pro motes decisions, not unlike Hopwood, which fail to reflect the nation's
diverse and complex legal histories. Historical legal evidence in sum
exposes the contradictions specific to each racial group, our racial identities, and the causation linking law and legal institutions. Contrary to
those rejecting knowledge and specifics about racial identities, the full
measure of judicial decisions and their connection with legal institutions
and our communities requires unpacking the particularities of hidden
legal histories, legal rhetoric, and discourse.
Following the invasion and Conquest of the former Mexican territories, times were not good for those of Mexican descent throughout the
American Republic. Deriving from Dred Scott and the Chicana/o cases,
"[t]he judicial decisions that formally conferred racial status in nineteenth-century California... had important consequences for the histori97. Id.
98. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996). See also Laura Mecoy, Wilson Assails Clinton
Stand on Racial Issues, He Calls for Equal Opportunity, Not Affirmative Action,

SAN DIEGO

& TRIB., June 23, 1997, at A3. The success of anti-affirmative action ideology is measured
by the decrease in students of color throughout major higher education institutions. See Linda
Leavell, Black Law Student Happy To Avoid Spotlight at UT, AUSTIN AM. - STATESMAN, July
13, 1997, at A13.
UNION

99. See Laura Mecoy, Wilson Assails Clinton Stand on Racial Issues, He Callsfor Equal
Opportunity, Not Affirmative Action, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIn., June 23, 1997, at A3. The

success of anti-affirmative action ideology is measured by the decrease in students of color
throughout major higher education institutions.
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cal trajectories for [non-white] groups in California."1 °
Although the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo granted them citizenship status, Chicanas/os were forced to endure challenges attacking the
validity of that status.' ° ' Lynchings, segregation, denying Chicano
soldiers returning from World War 11 the right to burial in their hometown cemeteries, poll taxes, and other measures, such as keeping Chicanas/os from the franchise, represented innumerable and complex challenges to their citizenship status.'0 2
In the African American community, the Court's reasoning in Dred
Scott also served as a trajectory for outside forces that extend into the
contemporary period, by narrowly limiting citizenship and emphasizing
the nature of exclusionary ideology. Taney tells us that:
The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the
sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government
through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the
'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty."0 3
To his detriment, the Court's reasoning did not extend to Mr. Scott and
its exclusionary force consequently includes the realm of violence,
lynchings, and segregation, which mandated the civil rights struggles of
the past with linkages into the present.
This deference to the Constitution depending on the claimant, in the
land grant experience and rejected in Dred Scott, exposes an inconsistent
position with respect to people of color. In Dred Scott, those of African
descent were not regarded as citizens. In the Chicana/o cases, although
treaty law defined a legal relationship with those of Mexican descent
and the United States, the Court disregarded the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and the force of the Constitution both literally and by design. In
several instances, shifting its reasoning to benefit a select class over the
claims of Chicana/o grantees or challenging their status as citizens, as in
the Dominguez case. In Dred Scott, moreover, the Court, ignoring its
100. TOMAS

ALMAGUER,

SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA

RACIAL

FAULT

LINES,

THE

HISTORICAL

ORIGINS

OF

WHITE

1, 14 (1994). See also "We Desire Only a White Population in

California," Id. at 17.
101. The example of questioning the citizenship of their children makes evident this point. De
whether a
Baca v. United States, 37 Ct. Cl. 482, 482 (1901). ("The question now presented is ..
child of Spanish parents born in New Mexico in 1809 was by birth an American citizen."). See
also In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337 (1987) (Guanajato, Mexico citizen Ricardo Rodriguez's bid for

U.S. citizenship).
102. See Almaguer, supra note 8, at 9 ("The very way in which racial lines were defined

became an object of intense political struggles.").
103. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
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reasoning from the land grant cases in which it privileged non-Mexican
grantees, shows the realm of interpretations of purportedly neutral law
benefiting one class over another in its failure to protect Mr. Scott.
Within this inconsistent treatment, the Court, therefore, consistently
defined both groups as outsiders.
Yet not all is as simple as it seems. This inconsistent legal treat-

ment, on its face, exposes a "consistency." By its rulings, the Court
defined both groups and their heirs as second class citizens. In doing so,
its language and attendant legal culture created a tool for the subaltern to

protest the politics of exclusion with linkages extending into the contemporary period. This is made evident by study of historical periods in
which legal institutions constructed beneficial rulings excluding people
of color. Yet it also mandates further race-based inquiry of the hidden

legal histories of both African-American and Chicana/o communities.
In the present, the politics of exclusion seek to deny our communities the full benefits of citizenship. Anti-Affirmative Action rhetoric is
closing the class of those benefiting from governmental contracts.

Outside of admission to higher education institutions, our communities
face innumerable challenges as to their presence. Chicanas can't buy

pizza, can't rent apartments, and cannot open bank accounts without
proof of citizenship." °

Assaults against speaking their native lan-

guage(s) demonstrates an egregious, yet sustained and ongoing challenge from the Conquest of their native lands to their culture and

10 6
ethnicity. 105 Teachers are discharged for teaching Chicana/o history,
or drivers are stopped while driving on public highways because of their
race. 107 African Americans are tied to the backs of trucks and dragged to
their death' 0 8 and victimized by other hate crimes that disallow the full

benefit of citizenship enjoyed by non-people of color. Young African
104. See generally Nancy Cervantes, Hate Unleashed. Los Angeles in the Aftermath of
Proposition 187, supra note 4 ("demonstrates the way in which the rhetoric permeating the debate
over Proposition 187 created an environment that gave license to discrimination and intoleration
and has had severe consequences for the Latino community .... ").
105. See, e.g., Spread of Spanish Unwelcomed By Some, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Feb. 7, 1999, at
A6 (reporting on a grocery store named "Supermercado Jalisco" in Norcross, Georgia, a suburb of
Atlanta, where Norcross fined the owner for violating a local ordinance that required English in
naming a business establishment.").
106. See Michael A. Fletcher, Debates on Ethnicity, Free Speech Flare as N.M. Teachers
Fight Dismissal, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1998, at A3.
107. Official Vows Probe of Racial Traffic Stops, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRW., Mar. 10, 1999, at
A9. The article reports on the Justice Department assuring "black and Hispanic leaders from New
Jersey" that "his agency is serious about investigating whether state troopers stop motorists on the
basis of their skin color. Police officers in New Jersey and several other states are accused of
employing "racial profiling" in deciding "which cars to stop." Id.
108. Victim's Face Was Painted In Truck-Dragging Debate, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 25,
1998, at A14 (Death of James Byrd Jr., who was dragged to his death behind a pickup truck by
three Euro-Americans). See also Giuliani Assails Parade Float As Racist Display, BUFFALO
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American women are further degraded by being followed in public
spaces and not allowed entry into public venues;"°9 African American
males, not unlike Chicanos, are sitting on death row in disproportionate
numbers to the dominant population.110
Within the spirit of the times, law is held hostage to those denying

the corresponding complexities branded on our racial identities. An
invaluable and immeasurable alternative exists with LatCrit theory. The
theoretical foundation of LatCrit as an alternative enterprise emphasizes
the relationship between legal rules and process. It exposes trajectories

that for too long have promoted the subordination and marginalization of
communities of color. The near invisibility of Chicanas/os in legal
scholarship reflects the intersection of law with their subordinate status;

leaves them to ride the margins of legal scholarship; consigns communities of color outside academic investigations; and otherwise disallows

the potential for transforming impoverished communities.

Falling

outside less inclusive paradigms, ultimately replicates the history of the
European conquest of advanced cultures as witnessed by communities of

color.
In the alternative, LatCrit embraces an anti-essentialist and antisubordination

theoretical

base

in

which

investigations

place

subordinated communities in the center of inquiry. LatCrit theory and its
emphasis on promoting knowledge, advancing social transformation,
expanding and connecting anti-subordination struggles, and cultivating
intellectual community and progressive coalitions, provides an immeasurable tool going beyond mere exposure of disparate treatment." 1 It
Sept. 10, 1998, at A5 (float "lampooning the June dragging death of a black man in Texas
was featured in a Labor Day parade").
109. See Tina Schatz, Women File Suit Against Area Tavern, Popular Eatery Faces Racial
Discrimination Complaint, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Feb. 9, 1999, at B I (African American females
filed a federal complaint alleging that the operators of a local tavern cancelled their reservations
upon discovery that the women were black).
110. It is well recognized that the death penalty is employed in some jurisdictions "particularly
if you are a person of color ....
"Douglas G. Robinson, The Death Penalty in the Twenty-first
Century, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 259 (1995). See also Michael Lumer & Nancy Tenney, The
Death Penalty in New York: An HistoricalPerspective, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 81, 107 (1995) (statistical
breakdown of executions and disproportionate use on African-Americans). For a perspective on
the nature of criminal law regarding people of color, see Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization
and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 193 (1998) (urging application of
sociology's "concept of community social organization" as retaining "untapped potential to
reconceptualize the problems created by both drugs and our current drug-law enforcement
regime" as opposed to practices in the present focusing on individuals charged with a crime).
111. See Francisco Valdes, Under Construction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community and
Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1093-94 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 7-8 (1998). See also
Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco V. Valdes, Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in
Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas, 19
NEWS,

CHICANO-LATINO

L.

REV.

503 (1998).
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extends, furthermore, beyond a clash of differing values and promotes in
progressive coalition building. Linking the contextual background of
law's role as in Dred Scott and the Chicana/o legal experience allows us
to listen to the voices of cultures for too long kept hidden in legal history. The onslaught of challenges that disallowed them the full attributes
of citizenship therefore makes clear the indispensability of LatCrit as an
alternative enterprise in analyzing the history of hypocrisy constructing
adverse race relations in the present.
CONCLUSION

Chicanas/os and African Americans have long contributed immeasurable and invaluable benefits to mainstream culture while sustaining
ongoing challenges to their right to the full attributes of citizenship
extended the dominant culture. The intersection of their racial standing
with law makes evident the uneven application of legal rhetoric and
norms. With Mr. Scott, the Court rejected his bid for freedom while
conforming to a purported "originalist" interpretation of the Constitution. Yet the Chicana/o legal experience makes evident that the court
side-stepped its purported "originalist" deference and disallowed the
supremacy obligations drawing from the same legal document. This historical legal amnesia requires not silence as those advocating lesser
inclusive models of law advocate, but in contrast obligates yet further
unpacking of our collective past. As an invaluable tool, the undisclosed
stories and their voices ultimately assisting progressive coalitions in
revealing long stymied transformative possibilities.I12

112. As to the connection between judicial indeterminism and the Chicana/o community see
George Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation
Experience, 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 333 (1994).

